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Abstract 
Bertrand Russell, while expressing his deep concern for a 
prevailing negligence about an intrinsic aspect of science, 
which he terms culture, opines that culture is not to be 
understood as something divorced from science. His 
demarcation of old culture from young culture; and his 
claim that it is the young culture which is responsible for 
valuing science for its usefulness rather than its intrinsic 
aspect, i.e., prepares the stage for arguing in favour of 
endorsement of cultural intrinsicality of science. The 
paper argues that viewed from Russell’s perspective, 
understanding culture as something unrelated to science 
will be a mistake, because it will carry a message to the 
mankind which is detrimental to the entire fabric of social 
cohesion. The paper focuses on the inculcation of scientific 
habit, an intrinsic aspect of science, as culture. While 
doing so, the paper intends to stress on the point that the 
scientific habit, which is linked to the Russellian method of 
analysis, common to both science and philosophy, plays a 
significant role in enabling one to focus on the cultural 
aspect of science. Analysis, in the province of philosophy, 
is used by Russell primarily to analyze language.  
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Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), while expressing his deep concern for 
a prevailing negligence about an intrinsic aspect of science, which 
he terms culture, writes in the following words: “In my own 
country, and to a lesser degree in other countries of the West, 
“culture” is viewed mainly, by an unfortunate impoverishment of 
the Renaissance tradition, as something concerned primarily with 
literature, history and art. A man is not considered uneducated if 
he knows nothing of the contributions of Galileo, Descartes and 
their successors” (Russell, 1958). These words of Russell suggest 
that science cannot be considered as being devoid of culture; or to 
change the figure of speech, culture is not to be considered as that 
which cannot be comprehended in the context of science. Science 
can be understood from different perspectives, e.g., scientific 
knowledge of science is the habit of nurturing scientific habit 
towards life and world; on the other hand, scientific technique 
through which the material progress of the world has come into 
being is another aspect of science. While scientific knowledge 
possesses value independent of the narrow utility of science, the 
scientific technique is exclusively concerned with the usefulness of 
science. Russell observes that a tendency to appreciate science as a 
technique rather than as knowledge has become a practice in the 
society due to which he regretfully utters: “…the intrinsically 
valuable aspects of science tend to be sacrificed to the merely 
useful, and little attempt is made to preserve that leisurely 
systematic survey by which the finer quality of mind is formed and 
nourished”(Russell, 2004, p. 27). What Russell asserts by these 
words is that the cultural aspect of science is necessarily associated 
with the formation of finer quality of the mind, and culture 
understood in this sense is not compatible with the merely useful 
aspect of science. One major concern of the present paper therefore 
is to enquire into Russell’s concept of culture which is 
understandable as an intrinsic aspect of science.  
In the Russellian framework, the backbone of the cultural value of 
science is its method of analysis since Russell emphasises that it is 
through this method, the scientific habit of looking at the world can be 
inculcated. This means that the scientific habit is the chief 




component to weigh the cultural value of science in the Russellian 
discourse. Russell claims that scientific habit can be transferred to 
philosophy, and the possibility of this transferability indicates that 
the habit is common to both the provinces of science and 
philosophy. In the province of philosophy, Russell’s method of 
analysis is primarily a method of analysis of language, which is 
spirited by scientific habit. As the inculcation of scientific habit and 
method of analysis of language are inseparably connected; and 
scientific habit is being viewed by Russell as a culture of science, the 
paper attempts to establish a link between analysis as a 
methodological device which is used in the analysis of language 
with that of the cultural aspect of science.  
The paper argues that to understand culture as something 
unrelated to science will be a mistake, because it will carry a 
message to the mankind which will be detrimental to the entire 
fabric of social cohesion; and it will deteriorate the progression of 
mankind. While doing so, the paper devotes a part to explicate the 
point that analysis as a device of methodological commonality 
between science and philosophy plays a significant role in enabling 
us to focus on the cultural aspect of science. To proceed with the 
argument, the present paper has been divided into the following 
sections. The section Analysis as a Method, a brief account of 
Russell’s understanding of the term Analysis has been put forth. 
However, the account is restricted to the core point of the method, 
i.e., the scientific spirit of the method. In the second section Science 
as Culture: Old and Young Cultures, a Russellian account of old 
culture and young culture has been put forward to decipher societal 
tendency behind appreciation of the extrinsic value rather than the 
intrinsic value of science. Here, Russell’s Liberal Decalogue1 in the 
form of Ten Commandments are cited as possible pathways for 
imbibing scientific habit or in other words culture of science. In the 
third section, Philosophic Uncertainty, a discussion has been 
presented to show how the uncertainty of philosophy is connected 
to the cultural value of science. The last section is the conclusion.  




2. Analysis as a Method 
As regards to the methods of philosophical investigations, Russell 
considers analysis to be the ‘strongest and most unshakable 
prejudice’ (Russell, 1997, p. 99). As Russell understood philosophy 
in the sense of analysis, philosophers like Elizabeth Eames remark 
that to understand Russell’s method of analysis is to understand his 
philosophy (Eames, 1969, p.56). His method of analysis is primarily 
a logico-mathematical method in that he uses mathematical logic to 
dissect philosophical problems. By applying this method he sought 
to remove ambiguities associated with ordinary language. This is 
the reason why Russell reconstructed ordinary language thereby 
formulating symbolic or ideal language for philosophical purposes. 
This means that by preferring ideal language over ordinary language 
in analysing philosophical issues, Russell sought to minimise the 
risk of error in philosophy. A distinctive example of his application 
of analysis within the sphere of technical philosophy is his concept 
of definite descriptions2. His theory of definite descriptions shows 
how certain phrases of ordinary language can be removed with the 
help of quantificational logic (a part of symbolic logic) which brings 
about clarity to ordinary language. In short, analysis is being used 
by Russell to purify language and to bring about the non-linguistic 
aspect of nature. Thus, the chief motive behind the application of 
analysis is to bring about clarity to the concepts analysed. Russell 
compares the method of analysis to the process of seeing something 
through a microscope after seeing it through naked eyes, e.g., 
bacilli in impure water are not visible through the naked eyes, 
unless it is viewed through the microscope. He defends his method 
and says: “There are many who decry analysis, but it has seemed to 
me evident, as in the case of the impure water, that analysis gives 
new knowledge without destroying any of the previously existing 
knowledge. This applies not only to the structure of physical 
things, but quite as much to concepts”(Russell, 1997, p. 98). That is, 
with the help of the method of analysis concepts can also be made 
clearer and more precise. But clarity and precision here cannot be 
understood to be equated with absolute certainty. It only means to 
be able to state something with a scientific outlook. Explaining the 
crux of the scientific outlook, Russell says that “The kernel of the 




scientific outlook is the refusal to regard our own desires, tastes, 
and interest as affording a key to the understanding of the 
world”(Russell, 2004, p. 33).  
Method of analysis is an intellectual endeavour because it demands 
an impersonal outlook toward life, and it is only through the 
scientific habit of mind, an impersonal outlook can be generated. 
The application of the method requires careful veracity on the 
applicant’s part to bring about more clarity to the concepts. While 
reflecting on the habit of careful veracity, Russell says that “The 
habit of careful veracity acquired in the practice of this 
philosophical method can be extended to the whole sphere of 
human activity, producing, wherever it exists, a lessening of 
fanaticism with an increasing capacity of sympathy and mutual 
understanding”(Russell, 2002, p. 789). Careful veracity is nothing 
but the scientifically spirited mind which has the incredible 
capability to dissect any issue by setting aside personal bias and 
prejudices.  
By culture, Russell means “a system of beliefs, or at least of habits, 
an artistic or intellectual tradition, and ways of making social 
coherence possible” (Russell, 2010, pp. 132-133). Within the 
Russellian paradigm, therefore, scientific habit, as a carefully 
driven intellectual habit, which is intrinsically present in science, 
and which is extensible to the entire human activity, qualifies to be 
signified as a cultural aspect of science. Culture, understood as an 
intrinsic aspect of science stimulates one’s scientific habit of 
thinking, and enables one to free oneself from personal biases and 
prejudices. We may now turn our attention to understand Russell’s 
understanding of science as culture.  
3. Science as Culture: Old and Young Cultures 
“Science”, Russell writes in the introduction to his book The Scientific 
Outlook, “is primarily knowledge; by convention it is knowledge of 
a certain kind, the kind, namely which seeks general laws 
connecting a number of particular facts”(Russell, 1954, p. 19). As 
Russell says that science as a technique is being admired in the 
contemporary society rather than science as knowledge, he mentions 




the reason for such admiration too. He says that science as a 
technique has the power to manipulate nature which has helped it 
receive more social importance than art. He further says that 
admiration of science as a technique rather than as knowledge is due 
to young culture. Mentioning two sorts of culture as old and young, 
in his book Fact and Fiction, and by demarcating between the two, 
Russell opines that the “The new culture is that of science—not, 
mainly, of science as knowledge, but, rather, of science as 
technique”(Russell, 2010, p. 133). The old culture, for Russell, is that 
which lays “stress upon what, in a certain sense, may be called 
play”(Russell, 2010, p.137), while the new culture emphasizes on 
work. Russell uses the word ‘play’ here to mean “whatever is not 
designed for practical utility”(Russell, 2010, p.137). Under the word 
play Russell includes art, literature and contemplative philosophy, and 
the pursuit of knowledge “when not subservient to 
technique”(Russell, 2010, p.137). As the word play, in the Russellian 
discourse, indicates knowledge which is not subservient to 
technique, the word play, therefore, acquires a unique import in his 
use, i.e., to value intrinsic value of knowledge without considering 
its practical utility. Russell cites examples of Greeks who pursued 
knowledge in mathematics and astronomy with the sole exception 
of Archemedes, for its own sake, and not for usefulness of 
knowledge. Based on Russell’s argument that old culture valued 
knowledge for its own sake, and the new culture values knowledge 
for its narrow utility, it can be held therefore that the oft-neglected 
cultural aspect of science is primarily due to young culture. 
Nevertheless, nowhere Russell says that the extrinsic value, i.e. 
utility of science is not to be valued anymore, because he is well 
aware of the effects of scientific technique in the society. Russell’s 
point here can be substantiated more clearly with the help of his 
own words: “Science as a technique has a future consequence of 
which the implications are not yet fully evident, namely, that it 
makes possible, and even necessary, new forms of human 
society”(Russell, 1954, p.11). However, to ignore the intrinsic aspect 
of science means to ignore the kernel of scientific outlook being 
mentioned above.  
Now, the question is—why to worth the intrinsic aspect of science 
at all according to Russell? Narrating the scientific attitude of mind 




(or we may say, narrating the intrinsic aspect of science), Russell 
writes:  
“The scientific attitude of mind involves a sweeping away of 
all other desires in the interests of the desire to know—it 
involves suppression of hopes and fears, loves and hates, and 
the whole subjective emotional life, until we become subdued 
to the material, able to see it frankly, without preconceptions, 
without bias without any wish except to see it as it is, and 
without any belief that what it is must be determined by 
some relation, positive or negative, to what we should like it 
to be, or to what we can easily imagine it to be”(Russell, 2004, 
p. 34)                    
This intrinsic value of science, which is carried out for the sake of 
desiring to know, i.e., to know something for its own sake, as 
mentioned above, is the culture of speculating something in a 
disinterested fashion. Such disinterested speculation, as is aimed at 
knowing something for its own sake, is a passion for truth to be 
approached impersonally. This impersonal outlook is the outlook 
which is associated with the method of analysis mentioned above. 
Once the truth is approached impersonally, Russell says, there arises 
“desire for a larger life and wider interests, for an escape from 
private circumstances, …”(Russell, 2004, p. 34). Scientific attitude 
thus broadens one’s horizon of speculation in that it capacitates 
someone to rise above one’s interests and to live for a larger life. 
Quest for a larger life is a necessary prerequisite for bringing about 
social coherence because it is only with the help of this quest one 
can get rid of narrow hopes and fears thereby can contribute to the 
cause of social cohesion.  
It would be worth citing at this point Russell’s Ten Commandments 
known as Liberal Decalogue which summarily represents his liberal 
outlook. The outlook is said to be liberal because it is inspired by 
the nourishment of the scientific habit of mind. This liberal outlook 
(Ten Commandments of Russell) encourages one to delve deeper into 
the adoption of certain ways so that one must not aspire to be 
absolutely certain of anything. It also enables one to be able to keep 
sufficient room for further analysis on any given issue. In other 
words, via this outlook, one keeps enough room for revision and 




rectification of one’s earlier thesis. To quote Russell: “The Ten 
Commandments that, as a teacher, I should wish to promulgate, 
might be set forth as follows: 
1. Do not feel absolutely certain of anything. 
2. Do not think it worthwhile to proceed by concealing 
evidence, for the evidence is sure to come to light.  
3. Never try to discourage thinking for you are sure to 
succeed. 
4. When you meet with opposition, even if it should be from 
your husband or your children, endeavour to overcome it 
by argument and not by authority, for a victory dependent 
upon authority is unreal and illusory.  
5. Have no respect for the authority of others, for there are 
always contrary authorities to be found.  
6. Do not use power to suppress opinions you think 
pernicious, for if you do the opinions will suppress you. 
7. Do not fear to be eccentric in opinion, for every opinion 
now accepted was once eccentric.  
8. Find more pleasure in intelligent dissent than in passive 
agreement, for, if you value intelligence as you should, the 
former implies a deeper agreement than the latter.  
9. Be scrupulously truthful, even if the truth is inconvenient, 
for it is more inconvenient when you try to conceal it. 
10. Do not feel envious of the happiness of those who live in a 
fool’s paradise, for only a fool will think that it is 
happiness” (Russell, 1998, p. 553-554)  
These Commandments can be understood as Russellian pathways 
which may function as a set of links between ones’ scientific outlook 
or liberal outlook and philosophical uncertainty. However, the word 
uncertainty here is not to mean scepticism—uncertainty here is used 
in a special sense which means that one is supposed to be tentative 
about one’s own thesis, because on the availability of new evidence 
one may have to rectify and revise one’s original thesis. This 




tentativeness, as it is scientifically spirited, is an integral component 
of culture. The discussion in the section below is being targeted to 
show the link of philosophic uncertainty with that of cultural 
intrinsicality of science.  
4. Philosophic Uncertainty 
In his book Unpopular Essays, Russell opines that ever since 
civilized communities are confronted with problems of two 
different kinds: first, there arises the problem of mastering natural 
forces, to acquire knowledge and skill which is required to produce 
tools and weapons, and to know how Nature can be utilised to 
produce useful plants and animals. This problem, he says, in the 
modern times, has been sought to be tackled by science and 
scientific technique. And Russell says that science has been 
successful in tackling the problem too. Second, there arises the 
problem of utilising our command over the forces of Nature in the 
best possible way. Here, Russell includes burning issues as 
democracy versus dictatorship, capitalism versus socialism, 
international government versus international anarchy, free 
speculation versus authoritarian dogma. Russell considers the 
second problem to be rather grave, and to deal with these 
problems, requires, he says, “a wide survey of human life, in the 
past as well as in the present, and an appreciation of the sources of 
misery or contentment as they appear in history (Russell, 1935, p. 
35).  In support of his statement, Russell puts forward one example 
of the production of an atom bomb. Atom bomb, he says, was 
produced by the combination of scientific genius and technical 
skill, but mankind got scared of hearing the name of atom bomb 
because of the devastation and traumatic effects made by the atom 
bombs during world wars. Hence, Russell concludes that 
something more than scientific technique has to be learnt to get to 
know how to best utilise our command over Nature. Scientific skill 
is necessarily needed to complete the task. But such knowledge has 
to be accompanied by philosophic wisdom. By wisdom, Russell 
means “a right conception of the ends of life” (Russell, 1954, p. 12). 
And the ends of life nevertheless are to be carried forward with a 
scientific habit of disinterested pursuit for truth.  




Russell by referring to the meaning of ‘Philosophy’ as ‘love of 
wisdom’ says that men are to acquire wisdom “if the new powers 
invented by technicians, and handed over by them to be wielded 
by ordinary men and women, are not to plunge mankind into an 
appalling cataclysm” (Russell, 1921, p. 36). Now, how does wisdom 
of philosophy in the said context capacitate mankind to save itself 
from cataclysm just mentioned? Viewed from the Russellian 
perspective, it can be said that it is nothing but uncertainty found 
in philosophy which can save humanity from any cataclysm.  
While speaking of philosophic uncertainty, Russell refers to the 
close relationship between science and philosophy. For example, he 
says that astronomy and psychology which were previously 
included in philosophy got branched off from philosophy now 
because “as soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject 
becomes possible, this subject ceases to be called philosophy, and 
becomes a separate science”(Russell, 1999, p. 90). This means that 
the moment any definite answer can be provided concerning any 
question, it ceases to be a philosophical question, and the question 
is placed in the sciences. This further means that philosophy is 
unable to provide any definite answer to any question. This causes 
Russell to remark that “The value of philosophy is, in fact, to be 
sought largely in its very uncertainty”(Russell, 1999, p. 91). 
Dwelling on the advantage of such uncertainty he writes: “…while 
diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what they may be; it 
removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have 
never travelled into the region of liberating doubt, and it keeps 
alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an 
unfamiliar aspect”(Russell, 1999, p. 91). For a man of philosophy, 
therefore, the world ceases to become definite, finite and obvious.  
This means that philosophy incites seed of wonder which kills the 
attitude of dogmatism in men, and suggests many possibilities for 
widening men’s contemplative thought. By widening possibilities 
philosophy enriches our ‘intellectual imagination’ (Russell, 1999, 
p.93). But intellectual imagination is not something fanciful. Rather, 
in Russell’s philosophical framework, such imagination has the 
greatest capacity to make one capable of expanding one’s 
speculative interest in life and the world. To expand one’s 
speculative interest means to desire to know the world. This again 




means that by expanding one’s speculative interest one goes 
beyond what is personal to conceive the universe as a whole. 
Philosophic speculation by aiming at the disinterested search for 
truth never places any limits to the pursuit of truth. As Russell 
rightly states: “When any limits are placed, consciously or 
unconsciously, upon the pursuit of truth, philosophy becomes 
paralysed by fear, and the ground is prepared for a government 
censorship punishing those who utter ‘dangerous thoughts’—in 
fact, the philosopher has already placed such a censorship over his 
own investigations”(Russell, 2002, p. 788). That is, not to put any 
limit to one’s pursuit of truth is a philosophical endeavour. This 
endeavour rests on one’s respect for philosophic uncertainty which 
is not possible to attain unless one is methodically spirited by 
analysis.  
5. Conclusion    
The ongoing discussion in the present paper sets the stage for 
removal of the prevailing misconception in the society as has been 
pointed out by Russell, i.e., science is divorced from culture. It 
shows why a passion for disinterested speculation deserves to be 
called a cultural aspect of science –- as because, such passion in the 
Russellian discourse opportunes mankind to inculcate a habit of 
desiring to know which means to know something for its own sake. 
Such a desire to know something for its own sake enables one to 
approach truth independently of one’s interests, biases etc. 
However, it cannot be denied that this journey of disinterested 
speculation is tough though not impossible. The journey has to be 
processed intellectually as desiring to know something for its own 
sake is an intellectual journey. Russell’s sincere submission that the 
growing attention to the scientific technique rather than scientific 
knowledge brings to light an underlying tension as regards to the 
value of science, i.e., it throws light on the tension between intrinsic 
value and the extrinsic value of science. His remark that the 
intrinsically valuable aspect of science is being tended to be 
sacrificed to the usefulness of science, i.e., to the extrinsic value of 
science is to be noted worthily to bring to light one significant 
reason responsible for the emergence of the mentioned sacrifice—




the reason which is related to his concept of old culture and the 
young culture. This again means that culture is not be conceived in a 
narrow utilitarian sense which means that it is not to be understood 
as a weapon to bring about useful results where the term useful is 
comprehended as something which is related to productions of 
material utility only.  
The cultural value, which is an intrinsic value of science in the 
Russellian parlance, is methodologically linked to analysis. As such, 
the cultural aspect of science can be judiciously said to be an aspect 
which possesses methodological value too. As the method of 
analysis is common to both philosophical discourse, and to science; 
by tracing the methodological commonality, a relation between value 
of philosophy, i.e., philosophic uncertainty and the intrinsic value 
of science, i.e., culture can be discerned in the Russellian discourse.   
It also follows from the ongoing discussion that careful veracity is 
Russell’s another significant highlight in the context of 
understanding culture as an intrinsic aspect of science. Careful 
veracity, as it relies on the available evidence present as of now, 
and welcomes new evidence; such veracity allows one to throw 
new light on one’s thesis at hand. This tentative veracity is the 
methodological aspect of Russell’s analysis. Russell, by holding the 
view that the habit of careful veracity attained in the process of the 
philosophical method of analysis, which is extensible to the whole 
sphere of human activity increases sympathy and mutual 
understanding; indeed refers to the value of tentative veracity. In 
short, this is what the scientific spirit is. Relentless strive toward 
inculcation of this tentative veracity, can therefore be cited as an 
endeavour—philosophic wisdom, which can perhaps be attempted 
to be seen as an aspect equal to that of the cultural aspect of science 
for Russell. In this regard, his Ten Commandments can be said to 
have paved the way for initiating a programme which will 
ultimately enable one to adopt liberal outlook—or in the context of 
science, it is culture. 





1 It first appeared at the end of his article ‘The Best Answer to 
Fanaticism—Liberalism’, in The New York Times Magazine, December 
16, 1951. 
2 See, Russell, B. (2004), On Denoting. in Marsh, Robert Charles (Ed.), Logic 
and Knowledge, London and New York. 
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